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Taylor rule in practice : Evidence from tunisia 
 Chaouech Olfa  
Faculty of Economics and Management of Tunis. University of Tunis 
Abstract 
This paper estimates the Taylor rule under the static version, then the dynamic version of the 
Central bank of Tunisia (CBT), using monthly data from 2002:Q1 to 2014:Q12. The empirical 
results indicate that the CBT followed the Taylor rule in its dynamic version. 
1.Introduction 
Taylor (1993) was the first who proposed a simple rule to model the monetary policy of 
federal funds. Such a rule provides a focal point for discussing the reaction functions and is 
increasingly used as a very famous reference in monetary policy discussions. This rule can be 
used to evaluate the subsequent monetary policy and to ensure the determination of future 
policy. It shows an increase in interest rates when inflation is above its target level and a 
decline in a recession. In his study of US data Taylor (1993) assumed that both inflation target 
rate and equilibrium real interest rate are equal to 2%. Because the Federal Reserve Bank 
aimed the stability of inflation and economic activity, it granted two coefficients equal to 0.5 
for the deviation of inflation and output-gap. However, several theoretical
1
 and empirical 
studies concerned with the exploitation of optimality conditions of this rule for the conduct of 
monetary policy. 
Aims its simplicity, several economists have criticized this rule because it is unlikely that such 
a rule is optimal for all countries, especially since the economy is more complicated and its 
structure varies across countries. In this context, McCallum (1993), noted that this type of 
function that is to say according to current data has not been operational since it needs the 
information due to the political decision makers don't have actually. 
Svensson (2003), showed that although the primary objective of monetary policy is the 
stability of inflation and output, a simple Taylor-type rule will not be optimal within a 
reasonable macroeconomic model. In the years ninety, economists have criticized the Taylor 
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 On the theoretical level, given a quadratic loss function of the central bank and linear curves of demand and 
aggregate supply, in the dynamic structure of the economy, we can get the Taylor rule by minimizing the loss 
function . 
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rule on variable timings. To solve this problem, the first reflections expressed the interest rate 
based on the values delayed in inflation and output. It's called "Backward-looking model." 
The fundamental principle of this type of model is to implicitly assume that private sector 
expectations are adaptive. It results in retrospective rules "Backward-looking". Many 
economists have criticized these types of rules. The most famous criticism is that of Lucas 
(1970), he studied how agents form their expectations of the future influencing actual 
behavior. According to Lucas economists do not change their behavior, based on past policies 
and static to describe the future behavior of agents. 
In addition to the Lucas critique, when following a version rule Backward -looking, the 
instrument of monetary policy reacts only to shocks transmitted by these two variables. 
However, in the presence of other types of shocks, such a rule does not lead to the price 
stability objective. furthermore, a central bank adopts a Backward-looking rule can achieve 
short-term goals rather than long-term goals.
2
 
Given the limitations of the rule type Backward-looking, recent research, such as that of 
Clarida, Gali et Gertler (1999), Svensson (2002) et Woodford (2004), argue that the models 
based on future expectations of economic indicators are better than those that meet the present 
or past variables. However, in practice central banks do not tend to take the past or current 
inflation as a target but expected inflation. Therefore, many researchers as Gali and Gertler 
(1998), Kozicki (1999), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Mayes et al (2000) have 
introduced inflation expectations and / or production for building a forward-looking version 
of the Taylor rule. In the late ninety, economists like Ball (1999), Svensson (2000) et Taylor 
(1999b) have criticized the Taylor rule on the point of failure of other key variables such as 
the exchange rate is an important variable in an open economy. The objective of this work is 
to determine the nature of the rule that better reflect the behavior of the central bank of 
Tunisia. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature studies. 
Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 introduces the basic methodology 
used in this paper. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 draws conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
After Taylor (1993), many economists estimated Taylor rule and its extensions. Indeed, 
McCallum (2000) used historical analysis to estimate a Taylor rule by using the economic 
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 the interest rate response to past changes in inflation will create more of the variability in the level of inflation 
than desired 
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data of U.S and U.K for the period from 1962 to 1999, and Japon from 1972 to 1998. He 
suggested that rules messages are dependent upon which instrument rather more than which 
target variable is used. 
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) studied and tested forward-looking monetary policy to study 
the behaviour of central banks in the United States, Japon and some European countries. They 
used the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The result showed that the Central banks 
in these countries followed the Taylor rule in their interest setting behavior
3
. 
Following Clarida et al (1998.2000), Ghadha, Sarno and Valente (2004) studied empirically 
whether asset prices and exchange rates may be included in a standard interest rate rule by 
using the data for the United States, the United kingdom and Japon since 1979. The result 
showed that asset prices and exchange rates can be utilised as information variables for a 
standard Taylor rule. 
Gorter, Jacobs and De Haan (2008) estimated Taylor rules by using Consensus Economics 
data for expected inflation and output growth, for the euro area, they found that ECB takes 
expected inflation and expected output into account in the setting interest rates. They showed 
that the indications of accommodating behavior by the ECB implied by contemporaneous 
Taylor rule seem to be mainly driven by the lack of a forward-looking perspective. 
Some empirical studies focused on emerging countries, they have estimated monetary policy 
rules of central banks in these countries. 
Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007), estimated forward-looking monetary policy rules for Israel 
and Turkey, the results showed that forward-looking Taylor rules seem to provide a 
reasonable description of central bank behaviour in both countries. Aklan and 
Nargelecekenler (2008) estimated the backward-looking and forward-looking monetary 
policy reaction functions of the central bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). They suggest 
that CBRT followed the Taylor rule in its interest setting behaviour. The response coefficient 
of inflation and output gap is more greater in the forward-looking model than in the 
backward-looking model. 
De Carvalho (2012), estimated Taylor rules by using the Consensus Economic Forecasts 
database for four largest Latin American economies, he used the GMM and real-time data of 
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 see for example Clarida et al (1999, 2000), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Orphanides (2001), Gerdesmeier and 
Roffia (2003), Huston and Spencer(2005), Taylor and Darvradakis (2006). 
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the output gap in Brazil and Mexico. He found that only for Mexico, interest rate market 
forecasts can be explained by Taylor rules. 
3.Data and stylized facts 
In this study, we use monthly data from 2002 M1 to 2014  M12 of the  interest rate, that was 
used as a proxy for the money market short-term interest rate. The seasonally adjusted 
industrial production index (IPI)  was used for the measure of the output gap. The output gap 
is defined as the change in the log of the observed output from its potential trend. The 
expression of this variable is given by: 
 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝 = 100 ∗ (
IPI−  potential  IPI  
 potential  IPI
) 
In economic literature, the methods of determination of potential output are diverse, namely, 
the method of estimating a production function and its factors. A second, by Hodrick Prescot 
(HP), and a third method of adjusting a linear trend with any disruptions. 
Several studies conducted tests of robustness of their estimates with different measures of the 
output gap. The majority of these studies showed that the HP filter can give a good estimate 
of the potential output is unobservable variable, since it reduces the fluctuations around the 
trend component. Therefore, we use the HP filter to estimate the potential output with a 
coefficient (λ = 14400) because the data are monthly. The index of consumer prices (CPI), 
and real effective exchange rate. These data are available in the database of the Central Bank 
of Tunisia (BCT) and the International Financial Statistic (IFS). 
4.Methodology 
Taylor (1993) suggests a very specific and simple reaction function of monetary policy that 
can be described by the contemporary inflation and the output gap given by: 
𝑖𝑡
∗=𝑟 +𝜋𝑡
∗+α(𝜋𝑡-𝜋𝑡
∗)+β𝑦𝑡     (1) 
with: 
𝑖𝑡
∗ the interest rate targeted by the central bank. In other words, it is the rate only in response 
to changes in inflation differentials and outptut gap, 𝜋𝑡  the inflation rate, 𝜋𝑡
∗ Variable target 
for inflation, 𝑟  the real interest rate of long-term equilibrium, α the amount by which the 
central bank raises the real interest rate in ex-post response to a rise in inflation to its target 
level,  𝑦𝑡  the output gap in period t it comes to the difference between actual output and 
potential, β amount by which the central bank raises the real interest rate in response to an 
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increase in real output above its potential level. In practice, central banks aim to smooth the 
interest rate. However, the reaction function is then described in terms of partial adjustment of 
interest rates
4
. The interest rate smoothing can be introduced into the model by means of the 
following partial adjustment mechanism
5
: 
𝑖𝑡 =  1 − 𝜌 𝑖𝑡
∗ + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡   (2) 
The smoothing parameter ρ є [0.1], with this partial adjustment the central bank at each period 
adjusts his instrument to remove only a fraction (1-ρ) of the gap  between the current target 
level and some linear combination of its past values. 
Following Taylor (1993), Clarida et al (1998, 1999, 2000) and Aklan and Nargelecekenler  
(2008), we specify the reaction function of the central bank where 𝑖𝑡
∗ is the nominal interest 
rate target for the short term of the central bank. 
𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑟 + 𝜋𝑡+𝑛
∗ + 𝛼  𝐸  
𝜋𝑡+𝑛
𝛺𝑡
 − 𝜋𝑡+𝑛
∗  + 𝛽𝐸(
𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑡
∗
𝛺𝑡
)        (3) 
Where 𝑟 is the real interest rate of long-term equilibrium, 𝜋𝑡+𝑛  the inflation rate between the 
period t and t+n, 𝜋𝑡+𝑛
∗  the inflation target for the period formed at the period t, α et β are 
parameters that describe the response of the policy rate to deviations of inflation and output 
from their targets respectively. E() expectation operator, 𝛺𝑡  the information provided for the 
period t. if Equation 2 and 3 are combined, the result is as follows: 
𝑖𝑡 =  1 − 𝜌 {𝑟 + 𝜋𝑡+𝑛
∗ + 𝛼  𝐸  
𝜋𝑡+𝑛
𝛺𝑡
 − 𝜋𝑡+𝑛
∗  + 𝛽𝐸(
𝑦𝑡−𝑦𝑡
∗
𝛺𝑡
) }+  𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑡    (4) 
if the expression of the mathematical expectation is excluded, the result  follows: 
𝑖𝑡 =  1 − 𝜌 ф +  1 − 𝜌 𝛼𝜋𝑡+𝑛 +  1 − 𝜌 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡  (5) 
 
Whère ф=𝑟 + 𝜋𝑡+𝑛
∗ , 𝑥𝑡=𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
∗, 𝜇𝑡 = − 1 − 𝜌  𝛼  𝜋𝑡+𝑛 − 𝐸  
𝜋𝑡+𝑛
𝛺𝑡
  + 𝛽  𝑥𝑡 − 𝐸   
𝑥𝑡
𝛺𝑡
   +
𝑣𝑡 ,  𝜇𝑡  is an error term which is not correlated with information at the instant t. 
Specification of Clarida et al (1998, 1999,2000) are implicit rules with fixed targets. In the 
existing literature, Eq. 5 is usually estimated by the GMM. In order to determine which 
specification represents better the policy followed by the Central Bank of Tunisia. This study 
estimates the Taylor rule in the statistical version,  the dynamic version and the forward-
looking rule. 
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 Several researchers like McCallum (1999) Levin et al (1999) argue that a Taylor rule type with an interest rate 
smoothing is relatively robust. 
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 voir Clarida et al (1998, 2000). 
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5.  Results and Interpretation 
We begin this empirical work by evaluating the Taylor rule in the traditional version. then we 
estimate the Taylor-type reaction function. 
 Evaluation of the traditional Taylor rule (RTT) 
The aim is to determine whether the traditional Taylor rule translates the behavior of policy 
makers of the Central Bank of Tunisia . The results of the equation (1) presented in Table 1. 
In this framework we adopt the idea of Ftiti (2010), which consists to calculate an interest rate 
𝑖𝑡  named the Taylor rate from the equation (1) then we will compare this rate with the interest 
rate of the monthly money market (tmm). When rates are statistically equal, we can conclude 
that the traditional Taylor rule is optimal. In contrast the rule will not be optimal and therefore 
we will try to find the optimal rule among the Taylor-type rules.   
Table.1 Descriptive Statistics of Taylor rates (i) and the monthly money market interest rates 
(tmm)  
Series N
6
 Mean DS
7
 Min Max 
Tmm 156 4.810 0.603 3.160 5.970 
I 156 5.315 2.089 0.882 9.152 
figure.1 Correlogram of the response of interest rates (in case of expansion) for Tunisia
0
2
4
6
8
10
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
I TMM  
according to the results of table.1 we found a noticeable difference between the two series. 
Graphics devolution of TMM and the resulting Taylor rates show a net incompatibility 
between the two curves for the Central Bank of Tunisia. As a result, the equation (1) does not 
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present the central bank behavior, the low explanatory power can be justified by the absence 
of the prospective nature in the traditional Taylor rule.  
 Reaction functions to Taylor 
Taylor-type reaction functions can be classified into two categories that are static reaction 
functions they are functions with the same variables as the Taylor rule, but with traditional 
estimable coefficients (without partial adjustment of the interest rate) . dynamic reaction 
functions, are rules that take into account the partial adjustment of interest rates based on 
current inflation data and the output gap. 
 Estimates of the static reaction function 
Under its static version reaction function is given by: 
𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼𝜋(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + 𝛼𝑦(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡) + ԑ𝑡     (6) 
equation (6) is a linear rule, econometrically, this kind of rule is estimable by  ordinary square 
method (OLS). However, the estimation results by such method leads in the presence to an 
autocorrelation error: DW = 0.13. In this case, the estimation may be produced by the GMM 
or by the method of instrumental variables. In this work we will use the GMM method
8
. 
The application of MMG method requires the choice of instruments, in most cases, the choice 
of instrumental variables is determined by the economic literature. It is to select the delays of 
the explanatory variables to determine the vector of instruments, without using too many 
instruments or too late to avoid the risk of over-identification. 
Gerdesmeir and Roffia (2003) estimate the different specifications to determine the optimal 
Taylor rule which represents the behavior of the monetary authorities in the euro area. They 
use MMG method, instruments are delays of one to six explanatory variables. Ftiti (2010) 
uses a four delays to estimate the optimal rule for New Zealand. In the case of Tunisia, Amiri 
and Talbi (2013) use the delays from one to four independent variables. Other studies with the 
same purpose, use delays from one to four of the independent variables. Thus, in connection 
with the estimation of equation (6) we choose the variables from one to four as instruments. 
The results are shown in Table.2. 
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 The generalized method of moments  is used to take into account the problem of endogenous one hand and 
then the hétérosédasticité and correlation with unknown on the other hand. 
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Table.2 Estimation results of the static feedback function for Tunisia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
**Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
***Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
taux calculé TMM  
The coefficient of inflation is (-0.196), it is statistically significant, but it is not consistent with 
the theory (negative coefficient). However, according to the graph of the evolution of TMM 
and the resulting Taylor rates, we can see a clear incompatibility between the two curves. This 
shows the low explanatory power of the estimated equation. Therefore, such an equation (6) 
cannot be regarded as an optimal response function for the BCT. J-Statistics  is equal to zero, 
indicating that these coefficients supplied by MMG are efficient 
 Estimates of the dynamic response function 
Rearrange the terms of the equation (6), adding the smoothing interest rates. The equation to 
be estimated takes the following form: 
𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜌𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡−1 + ф𝜋(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗) + ф𝑦(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡) + ԑ𝑡         (7) 
with 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-Statistic 
 
probability 
C 5.004365*** 43.01126 0.0000 
𝜶𝝅 -0.196666*** -3.036665 0.0028 
𝜶𝒚 0.118501* 1.960806 0.0517 
𝑹𝟐 -0.489675 - - 
𝑹 𝟐 -0.509276 - - 
J 0.0000 - - 
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ф𝑖 = (1 − 𝜌)𝛼𝑖  
Table.3 Estimation results of the dynamic response function for Tunisia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
**Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
***Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
 
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
taux calculé tmm  
Econometric results show the expected signs with the remarkable significance of the residual 
term. the figure shows that the reaction function of the Tunisian monetary authorities 
according to the dynamic rule  illustrates in a manner acceptable the estimated interest rate 
dynamically according to equation (7).the graph shows that the inclusion of the delayed 
interest rate determines the best central bank reaction function. the coefficient of the inflation, 
equal to 1.061 greater than 1. Indeed, according Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003) «a parameter 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-Statistic 
 
Probabilité 
C 0.068937 0.125735 
 
0.548277 
ф𝒕𝒎𝒎 0.979365*** 40.50994 0.0000 
ф𝝅 0.022354* 1.798697 0.0741 
ф𝒚 0.002581 0.206943 0.8363 
𝑹𝟐 0.942697 - - 
𝑹 𝟐 0.941535 - - 
J 0.000000 - - 
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of inflation higher than 1 implies that the short-term interest rate must increase when the rate 
of inflation increases, this has a stabilizing effect on inflation.». the coefficient of the output 
gap equal to 0.119 is insignificant. these results confirm that the objective of the CBT is to 
target inflation. 
 Estimates of the Forward-looking taylor rule 
By introducing inflation expectations, our approach is to consider that the active period of 
monetary policy is one year we assume that the BCT reacts to (𝜋𝑡+12). We can rewrite 
equation (7) as follows: 
𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝜌𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑡−1 + ф𝜋(𝜋𝑡+12 − 𝜋
∗) + ф𝑦(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡) + ԑ𝑡       (8) 
Table.4 Estimation results of the forward-looking rule for Tunisia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
**Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
***Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-Statistic 
 
probability 
C 0.320891** 2.146215 0.0336 
𝜶𝒕𝒎𝒎 0.934976*** 31.05279 0.0000 
𝜶𝝅𝒂 -0.014815 -1.607156 0.1103 
𝜶𝒚 0.013426 1.048151 0.2964 
𝑹𝟐 0.942718 - - 
𝑹 𝟐 0.941482 - - 
J 0.000000 - - 
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3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
taux calculé TMM  
The coefficients related to the gap between expected inflation in a year and the implicit 
inflation target and the output gap is not significant. Also the figure  shows the evolution of 
TMM and calculated rate still present differences between the two curves. Therefore, equation 
(7) can't be regarded as the reaction function Tunisian monetary authorities. 
 Estimates of the dynamic reaction function increased exchange rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Indicate the significance level at 10%. 
**Indicate the significance level at 5%. 
***Indicate the significance level at 1%. 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-Statistic 
 
probability 
C -0.448043 -1.360963 0.1760 
𝜶𝒕𝒎𝒎 0.951601*** 29.66180 0.0000 
𝜶𝝅 0.042753* 1.723419 0.0873 
𝜶𝒚 0.004442 0.283249 0.7775 
𝜶𝒆 0.006473* 1.798400 0.0746 
𝑹𝟐 0.944530 - - 
𝑹 𝟐 0.942712 - - 
J 8.97E-43 - - 
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3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
taux calculé TMM  
6.Conclusion 
Taylor is the first who has made a rule of conduct of monetary policy expressed in terms of 
short-term interest rates. Several researchers have criticized this rule on many points. On the 
basis of these criticisms different rules resulted from the latter called "Taylor rule type" or 
"rules to Taylor."  
Within this work, we estimate the CBT reaction function using monthly data from 2002 to 
2014 M1 M14. Our results show that the Taylor rule in the dynamic version explains the 
policy rule of the CBT. Then we add the exchange rate to this  rule, we find that adding this 
variable  improve the  results. 
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